Russia entered international trade markets offering fur, wax, and honey. Wheat established itself as an important export commodity no earlier than the 11^th–13^th centuries: agriculture developed, trade with Byzantium, Khazaria, and Western countries intensified. Grain was exported along the From Varangians to Greeks route, passing through Kyiv, Novgorod, Smolensk. Through Crimean ports, it flowed into the Ottoman Empire and further to the Mediterranean Sea, while Baltic ports (Riga, Tallinn, Novgorod, and, later, St. Petersburg) channelled it to Northern European countries. Wheat sales revenues were used to purchase foreign goods and technologies, part of the going toward constructing and decorating churches, rearming the military. In the 16^th–18^th centuries, Poland actively purchased Russian wheat and, through the Caucasus region, grain reached Persia (modern-day Iran) and Central Asia.

In the 1840s, Europe saw explosive population growth so more bread was needed. Russia met part of this growing demand, virtually doubling annual grain exports during the Second Industrial Revolution. Between 1830 and 1850, grain, especially wheat, accounted for 60–70% of Russian exports; approximately 30–40% of the exported wheat went to Britain. Even so, in the battle for the British market, the United States emerged victorious, we’ll discuss the reasons below.

“We’ll go hungry ourselves but we’ll still export”

This phrase, which has become proverbial, is attributed to Ivan Vyshnegradsky, the Russian Minister of Finance between 1887 and 1892. Under his tenure, imports were restricted while exports were vigorously encouraged in order to maintain maximum gold reserves in the country. Not only surplus produce was exported but essential stocks as well, resulting in famines whenever crops failed, as happened in 1891 and 1892. Despite Vyshnegradsky’s departure, the policy remained largely unchanged. Wheat production gradually increased but people inside the country continued to suffer from malnutrition.

Despite the large volumes of wheat being exported, sometimes excessively so, profits were disproportionate to the quantities sold. Russian economist Pyotr Lyashchenko lamented that Russia lagged behind the United States and Germany in terms of profit margins because Russian grain was contaminated, of varying quality, and dumped onto the market haphazardly, without sale guarantees. Consequently, exporters lacked bargaining power, restricting themselves to neighbouring buyers and those willing to pay below-market prices. Additionally, yields at the beginning of the 20th century were low, about 1.5 times lower than in the United States, and the export infrastructure was underdeveloped: many Russian ports could not accommodate modern ships, there were inadequate storage facilities and elevators, and the commercial fleet was limited.

Nevertheless, by the start of World War I, Russia controlled roughly 10–12% of the global wheat export market, shipping up to 6 million tonne a year. These exports provided up to 15% of the Tsarist Treasury’s income.

From Revolution to Perestroika

War, revolution, ensuing economic collapse and, subsequently, the famine of 1921–1922 forced the Soviets to import wheat. On the pretext of these purchases, church valuables were confiscated. Although hunger eased somewhat, it did not disappear entirely; nevertheless, exports were resumed forcefully: money was urgently needed for industrialization. Wheat was sold overseas, while equipment and specialists were paid for using the proceeds; bread was converted into currency as quickly as possible.

At the beginning of the 1930s, grain exports generated 20% of the hard-currency revenues for the aggressively developing state. The Great Depression in the USA opened up new sales markets for the Soviet Union, and falling wheat prices allowed an increase in supply volumes. In August 1930, amid record harvests, Joseph Stalin wrote to Vyacheslav Molotov: “Push ahead full speed with bread exports. That’s the key issue right now. If we can export bread, credits will come.”

Again, recourse to imports became necessary during World War II, when the USSR lost tens of millions of hectares of arable land, let alone the people who cultivated it. Grain and flour and, later, seeds for replanting, arrived under lend-lease agreements.

After the War, the country continued importing grain while also exporting it (for instance, in 1947, the nation shipped out 2.5 million tonnes of wheat and imported 1.5 million). Current export commitments had to be fulfilled, and hard currency had to be obtained somehow. During the 1950s, exports increasingly shifted focus to socialist bloc countries: Eastern Europe, Cuba, certain Asian and African nations actively supported by the USSR. To maintain export levels and avoid breaching agreements, the Soviet leadership launched a campaign to develop virgin lands in northern Kazakhstan and southern West Siberia. As we recall, this initiative ultimately failed.

Import volumes grew steadily, dependence on imports becoming chronic. In 1972, the USSR purchased around 8 million tonnes of wheat from the USA, the biggest agricultural deal between the two countries at that point. Even though, in 1980, the country harvested over 98 million tonnes of wheat, the Soviet Union was the world’s biggest grain importer, bringing in 30–45 million tonnes a year (mostly wheat). Domestic supplies were insufficient for both humans and livestock: animal husbandry expanded but was highly inefficient. According to several economists, dependence on imported grain, alongside other factors, pushed the USSR toward reforms and eventually contributed to its dissolution.

New Russian Export

In the first few years following the collapse of the USSR, wheat exports virtually ceased; the market was forming chaotically, privatization was under way, including of large-scale agricultural assets. Many collective farm lands (as during wartime, accounting for dozens of millions of hectares) lay abandoned. In 1992, there were bad harvests.

The government managed to correct the situation by introducing several key regulations in the late 1990s and early 2000s. First, a market for agricultural land formed: individuals could buy land and lease it long-term without risking expropriation, this acting as an incentive to expand areas under crops wherever profitable. Second, farmers gained access to the global wheat market precisely when grain prices were high. Finally, the state stopped dictating what to sow and where.

Since 2007, exports have been regulated to varying degrees through quotas and, since 2015, through flexible duties, which exporters criticize as making their business less predictable. Nevertheless, given today’s abundance of grain in Russia, these restrictions do not pose insurmountable barriers to exports.

Over twenty years, wheat exports have grown from 6.6 million tonnes to 54.1 million tonnes, averaging 40.9 million tonnes over the past five years. One in five batches of exported wheat worldwide is Russian. Furthermore, exports and their expansion do not compromise internal consumption, which remains consistently high. In 2023, Russia had a record wheat harvest of about 92.6 million tonnes, in 2024 – 82.4 million tonnes. For 2025, the Institute for Agricultural Market Conjuncture forecasts a yield of up to 86.5 million tonnes, while International Grains Council estimates 80.6 million tonnes (excluding Crimea and newly annexed territories).

The map of Russian wheat exports is evolving, notes the Russian Grain Union. Today, 50 countries import Russian wheat (last year there were 65). Egypt remained number one in 2024, purchasing 70% of its total wheat imports from Russia; enjoying hot flatbreads at an Egyptian resort, it’s pleasant to remember that they might be made of ground Russian grain. Algeria has become another major buyer and imports by African and Southeast Asian countries are rising: deliveries to Morocco have increased fifteenfold, Nigeria’s purchases nearly tripled, Vietnam’s have risen by 91%, Tanzania’s by 29%, the UAE’s by 59%. Syria, Angola and Djibouti are importing more. In 2024, Russia increased wheat shipments to China 2.5-fold; although these remain modest volumes and the country China ranks sixth among suppliers to the Chinese market, the bet on expanding this direction is very high. For example, construction of the Trans-Baikal Grain Terminal was launched in 2022, addressing the problem of rail gauge differences between China and Russia and promoting wheat production and exports in the Siberian, Far Eastern and Urals Federal Districts.

Most wheat flows through Black Sea ports: Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Azov. Smaller amounts pass through St. Petersburg’s port and the prospects appear promising for shipments to Asia via Vladivostok. Over the year, the number of export companies halved, not owing to shrinking markets but because bigger players receive bigger quotas. This is known as the historical principle of quota distribution: the more you exported in the previous year, the greater your export opportunities next year. Competition is fierce and logistics capacities, primarily elevators at export ports allowing reduced export costs and handling of big volumes, are concentrated in a few big firms. In 2024, 15 Russian export companies accounted for 85% of total exports, making it challenging for smaller and medium-sized players.

Today, Russian wheat is widely utilized in baking, feed, and food industries across the globe. In addition to foodstuffs, Russia is one of the biggest suppliers of feed-grade wheat used to feed cattle, pigs and poultry in China, India and elsewhere. Ethanol, an important component of biofuel, and food additives such as gluten (glutenin), used in bread, pasta, and animal feeds, are produced from Russian wheat. Hard varieties from Siberia are excellent for making pasta. Unlike 120 years ago, its quality is standardized, and the price per tonne is typically USD 5–15 cheaper compared to Western competitors.